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Abstract
This chapter discusses the situation of electricity markets both in the
European Union countries and in transition economies. We analyse
the possibility of reducing the monopoly of oil shale-based energy
production and opening the market in electricity in Estonia. To
evaluate the prospects of oil shale-based electricity production, we
analyse the formation of the oil shale-based electricity production
price today and in the future, focusing on the share and growth of the
environmental component in the production price. The environmental
costs of oil shale-based electricity production depend primarily on the
resource tax and pollution charge rates. We predict considerable
growth of these costs, especially in the tax rates of greenhouse gases
(mainly CO2) in connection with the tightening of the environmental
requirements in the future.
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1. Introduction
By today, many countries across the world, including the European
Union (EU) member states, have fully or partly liberalised their
electricity market. By liberalisation of the electricity market, we mean
in most general terms the opening of the market to competition. As at
the present technical development stage, electricity transport
(transmission and distribution) is considered a natural monopoly.  The
opening of the electricity market requires the establishment of new
market structures that separate generation from the transmission and
distribution business thus introducing competition across the
electricity supply chain. In Europe, the process of electricity market
liberalisation has progressed quite radically, being formalised with the
EU Electricity Directive (96/92/EC) in February 1997.
Electricity market liberalisation may also involve negative
aspects such as greater risks to investors, backlashes to environment
saving technologies, to electricity systems’ security of supply, etc.
Therefore, energy firms have increasingly started to use mergers and
purchases of other enterprises in order to benefit from increasing
returns to scale. Such cost economising also creates better conditions
for competition in a free electricity market and may even influence
prices in this market.
The restructuring experience in many countries has indicated that
the introduction of competition in network-related utilities is a
complicated task. National practices for liberalisation have differed
greatly in terms of the degree of concentration in generation, the
stringency of unbundling requirements, the design of market
mechanisms, and the extent of public ownership and regulatory
institutions. The key issue has been to identify the proper balance
between liberalisation and ensuring adequate generation and network
capacity (Newbery, 2001). In small systems, like in Estonia, the
unbundling may bring about some losses of economies of scale.
Therefore, the vertical integration model of electricity sector presented
3by Kwoka (2002) should be considered when projecting the future for
the electricity sector in Estonia.
The Estonian electricity sector is dominated by the role of local
mineral resource – oil shale – in electricity generation. Two large
power plants (AS Narva Elektrijaamad) and a number of small
combined electricity and heat production plants are using oil shale. AS
Narva Elektrijaamad was founded in 1999 based on the Balti and
Eesti Power Plants, which were put into operation in 1959-1973. The
total installed electrical capacity of Narva Elektrijaamad is 2700 MW
today. The Estonian electricity sector is organised around a vertically
integrated utility – Eesti Energia AS – a state-owned enterprise that
controls the generation, transmission, distribution as well as retail
sales throughout almost all of the country. Thus, today Estonia
actually presents a monopolistic electricity market of Eesti Energia
AS.
Estonia is a small country where electricity production, mining
and processing of oil shale is a regional economic complex1 with
difficult social problems. Estonia is facing a complex situation in
breaking up this monopoly and developing a free electricity market.
Estonia has, therefore, applied for a transition period for solving oil
shale-based energy sector development and opening of electricity
market issues in the EU accession negotiations. According to the
agreement achieved, Estonia will open 35% of its electricity market
by the end of 2008 (Treaty, 2003). Estonia was granted a transition
period until 31 December 2015 regarding the implementation of the
EU Directive on reduction of emission into air from large combustion
plants (2001/80/EC) for oil shale-fired power plants. The latter means
that Estonia was granted a transition period also in respect to
reduction of air pollution from oil shale-fired power plants. In spite of
this provision, the first energy units in Narva Power Plants are being
transferred to use new technology.  The plant will be using circulating
fluidised bed combustion, which is expected to considerably reduce
air pollution, and it is likely that the share of oil shale in electricity
generation will diminish in the future (Ots, 1999).
This chapter discusses the situation of electricity markets both in
the European Union countries and in transition economies. We
consider the possibilities of opening the electricity market and
reducing the monopoly of oil shale-based energy production in
Estonia. For evaluating the future of oil shale-based electricity
production, we study the formation of the oil shale-based electricity
production price today and in the future, focusing on the share and
growth of the environmental component in the production price. The
environmental costs of oil shale-based electricity production depend
4primarily on the resource tax and pollution charge rates. We predict
considerable growth of these costs, especially in the tax rates of
greenhouse gases (mainly CO2) in connection with the tightening of
the environmental requirements in the future.
The increase of the oil shale-based electricity production price
primarily as a result of the high CO2 tax rate may cause a contraction
of oil shale-based electricity production, as well as a reduction of air
pollution as a result of using new combustion technology. We analyse
the possible scenarios to compensate for this production with imported
energy resources. We also analyse sustainable development indicators
for the Estonian energy sector and compare them with respective
indicators of EU member states and neighbouring countries.
2. The Development of Electricity Markets: EU
Experience and the Problems of the Transition
Economies
Until recently, the electricity sector in most countries was
characterised by vertically integrated monopolistic companies, many
of which were state owned and operated in strictly regulated captive
markets. This did not encourage profitability or energy efficiency and
is being progressively abandoned by liberalisation processes in many
countries.
2.1. Liberalisation
By liberalisation of the electricity market, we mean in most general
terms to the opening of the market to competition. The liberalisation
of energy markets involves three basic processes: privatisation,
unbundling and market deregulation. These may or may not all be
applied in one country, depending on the model of liberalisation
adopted.
The privatisation of state-owned assets wholly or partially is
usually the first step in liberalising markets. If this is done only
partially, the state may retain a share or even a controlling “golden”
share. Or the state may retain only a minority share for representation.
Unbundling is the separation of the monopolistic functions
(transmission and distribution) from the competitive functions
(production and supply). Some countries have done this by assigning
the four functions into separate companies which all operate
commercially, and dividing the competitive elements of production
5and supply into many competing companies. Electricity can only go
down one line, but different entities can produce it competitively and
sell it. Other countries have conformed to the minimum requirement
of retaining a vertically integrated utility but separating the accounting
functions within one company.
Competition is introduced through independent electricity
producers and energy sellers. There are many different permutations
of this to suit national requirements. An industrialised country with a
mature infrastructure and strong industrial off-take has different needs
from a developing country, where the provision of cheap electricity is
an overwhelming priority for social and political stability.
Deregulation must provide customers with a choice of supplier and
introduce price competition.
The first steps towards deregulation of the electricity market
were taken in 1978 in the United States with the enactment of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, opening wholesale electricity
markets to non-utility producers of electricity. Chile began its reform
in 1982 and New Zealand in 1987. In Europe, deregulation started in
1989 (England and Wales) and in 1991 in Norway. An increasing
number of countries are now committed to opening up their electricity
sectors to competition. In Europe, the process has progressed quite
radically, being formalised with the EU Electricity Directive
(96/92/EC) in February 1997. The Directive laid down the rules
regarding the organisation and functioning of the electricity sector
(e.g. separate accounts for generation, transmission and distribution
activities; time schedule for the market opening), access to the
electricity network (negotiated or regulated third party access, or
single buyer), and criteria and procedures for granting authorisations
for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity.
Compliance varies from country to country. Table 1 presents the
basic legislative position of EU member states in regards to electricity
market liberalisation, showing the proportion of the market open to
competition and the relevant eligibility thresholds (Commission,
 2002).
6Table 1. Measures Adopted by EU Member States in Implementing
Directive 96/92/EC  (as in October 2002)
Market
opening
Eligibility threshold 100%
opening in / by
Austria 100% – 2001
Belgium 52% 1/10 GWh 2003/7
Denmark 35% 1 GWh 2003
Finland 100% – 1997
France 30% 16 GWh ?*
Germany 100% – 1999
Greece 34% 1 kV ?*
Ireland 40% 1 GWh 2005
Italy 45% 9 GWh ?*
Netherlands 63% 3*80 A 2003
Portugal 45% 1 kV 2003
Spain 55% 1 GWh 2003
Sweden 100% – 1998
UK 100% – 1998
  * not yet decided
The studies and reports analysing the implementation of the
Directive on the internal market of electricity (Commission,
2001; Commission,  2002) demonstrate that the EU member states can
be divided into two groups on the basis of the establishment rate of
internal market requirements:
? countries with a liberalised electricity market;
? countries with slow liberalisation process.
The different rates of development are largely due to the
previously developed structures of the electricity system in these
countries – the scope of vertical integration, number of firms
operating in the system, etc. In the first group of countries, the
liberalisation process progressed faster than envisaged in the directive.
This group includes, for example, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland
and Germany (markets completely liberalised) and Denmark, Austria,
the Netherlands, Spain and Italy. The main reasons for the faster
development are:
? pressure from industrial consumers with the purpose to
achieve lower prices and better services;
? positive experiences of the countries which have completed
liberalisation;
? attempts of national policy designers to prepare energy firms
with competition in the home market for entrance to the
common EU market.
7In addition to the right of consumers to choose an electricity
supplier, the opening of a market also requires a sufficient number of
electricity producers. Also, independent electricity producers must
have access to the market in addition to firms specialised in electricity
production.  This, however, is often complicated. Since the minimally
necessary number of producers depends on many circumstances (e.g.
size of market, quality of regulation, competition from abroad, etc.), it
is not possible to have a model of liberalisation that is suitable for all
countries.
Economic theory gives no clear indication of the minimum
number of producers necessary for a market to arrive at a a
competitive price-quantity equilibrium, which is defined as an
approximate price equal to marginal cost. Since 1990s, both
experimentalists and policy makers have generally believed that six to
ten comparably sized suppliers define a workably competitive market
(Green  and  Newbery,  1992; Andersson  and  Bergman,  1995).
Lately, some experimental studies have indicated that a higher number
of suppliers may be necessary to approximate competitive market
solutions (Chapman  et  al.,  2002). Some researchers even suggest
that not less than 30 equal-sized market participants can bring
equilibrium price to an acceptable level of 5% above marginal cost
(Rudkevich  et  al.,  1998).
Liberalisation may involve problems and negative implications
also in terms of electricity system development (OXERA,  2001; 
Matthes  and Timpe, 2000). For example, the liberalisation process
involves greater risks to investors, which in turn compels them to raise
the desired productivity level. Investors may then prefer projects with
lower specific investments and high efficiency (e.g. combined cycle
gas turbine plants). In the longer term, this may create the risk of
deficit, since due to higher risks less investments are made into new
production capacities than would be expedient for the system as a
whole. For the same reasons, the liberalisation may backfire on the
environment saving technologies, which are as a rule more capital
intensive. For example, the application of hydro, wind and solar
energy would be less attractive.
The liberalisation of electricity markets also has brought new
aspects to the security of supply in electricity systems. Many events in
the last couple of years have referred to seriousness of possible
problems.2 Though the installed production capacity in the electricity
systems in EU countries on the whole considerably exceeds the
cumulative peak load, we must take into consideration a kind of
fragmentation of the EU electricity system and insufficient electricity
trade between countries. In addition to the amount of installed
8production capacity, we must also consider the structure of capacities.
For example, hydro-energy plants contribute 62% of total capacity in
Estonia’s close neighbours, the Nordic countries Norway, Sweden and
Finland, and such dependence on the weather may cause great risks.
Since the price level in the Nordic electricity market has been low for
several years, in fact for a time it was even below the short-run
marginal costs, the incentives to build new production capacities have
been weak.
Despite some generally negative aspects of the electricity market
liberalisation and some concrete problems in some countries, the
process on the whole has been regarded as a significant step in raising
the efficiency of the national electricity sectors (Commission, 2002).
The opening of the national electricity market in turn enables a nation
to co-operate internationally and creates more effective electricity
trade through international electricity markets.
2.2. Consolidation
In recent years, electricity firms have attempted to improve efficiency
by increasing production/activity scales. Since electricity consumption
growth is relatively small, such increase in production/sales would be
limited and an extremely long-term process. Therefore, firms have
paid increasingly more attention to other expansion possibilities – the
merging of enterprises and the purchasing of other enterprises partly
or wholly.
The main positive factors arising in connection with the
enlargement of enterprises are:
? lower capital costs ensuing from the returns to scale;
? more favourable fuel and equipment purchasing possibilities;
? possibility of dividing overhead and marketing costs between
more consumers;
? possibility of more flexible administration of the structure of
production capacities;
? reduced duplication of management and administration
activity;
? simplified risk administration.
As mentioned by merging firms, the main reason for the active
consolidation process is the effects of synergy from mergers, which
enable a kind of cost economising, and at same time creating better
conditions for competition in a free electricity market. However, the
process has another facet, which the researchers of the electricity
market development have recently noted – such consolidation often
involves the possibility to influence and set prices in the market. Also,
9participation in several firms in some cases provides large
corporations with the possibility to avoid competition and design
strategic prices. Cross-subsidisation and discriminative treatment of
the third party (e.g., distribution network company gives priority to its
own market share) is also possible. To evaluate this tendency, it is
important to consider that excessive concentration as a rule weakens
the effect of market mechanisms.
In the EU, the question has been raised of what strategy to
choose to control concentration and to preserve competition in the
electricity sector in long-term perspective. Despite the internal
electricity market rules established by the EU, there is no common
model of electricity system enterprise taking shape so far.  In it is
important to note that these enterprises differ essentially by ownership
type, size, structure and profitability. Table 2 provides an overview of
the concentration rate of electricity enterprises in EU countries,
reviewing the structure of the market for electricity generation and for
retail supply. It should be noted that market share in supply tends to
reflect the organisation of local distribution networks, i.e. existence of
a high number of retail supply companies each with a small market
share is not necessarily indicative of active competition since it may
be a result of the existence of small local monopolies.
Eurostat has published some statistical data on the concentration
of electricity markets in EU member states (Eurostat, 2002). Three
indicators were taken to represent the market structure of the
electricity generation and retail markets:
? the number of companies with a market share of at least 5% of
the total;
? the aggregated market share of those companies;
? the market share of the largest company.
In 2000, the UK, the Netherlands and Austria contained the
highest number of companies with a market share greater than or
equal to 5% in the generation and supply markets. In the generation
and supply industries in Greece, France and Ireland, only one
company had a market share equal to or greater than 5%. This was
also the case in Portugal with regard to supply. The highest
concentration in generation and supply was recorded in Greece. In
generation, the highest market share of the largest company was found
in Greece and in Ireland (97%). In Belgium and France, the share
earned by the largest company also exceeded 90%. The lowest market
share was registered in Finland (23%), then Austria (33%), Germany
(34%) and Denmark (36%). In supply, in those member states for
which data was available, the market share of the largest company
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ranged from 100% in Greece and Portugal to 11% in Finland and 17%
in Denmark.
Table 2. Concentration of Electricity Enterprises in EU Countries in
2000
Suppliers
Installed
capacity
(GW)
Transmission
utilities
Distribution
utilities
total incl.
independent
of distribution
utilities
Austria 18.2 3 155 40 6
Belgium 15.7 1 33 16 16
Denmark 12.7 2 77 70 6
Finland 16.6 1 100 80 9
France 115.4 1 172 225 41
Germany 118.3 4 880 ca 1200 200
Greece 10.3 1 1 7 6
Ireland 4.8 1 3 19 18
Italy 78.1 1 219 170 135
Netherlands 20.6 1 18 33 15
Portugal 10.7 1 3 11 10
Spain 52.6 1 297 149 n.a.
Sweden 33.6 1 248 120 20
UK 78.9 4 15 59 59
Source: OXERA, Netherlands Energy Research Foundation, Energy System
Analysis and Planning Centre ATOM, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne,
European Commission, DG TREN. (October) 2001. Electricity Liberalisation
Indicators in Europe.
These shares indicate that a significant degree of concentration
exists in generation in many member states. The presence of
generators with dominant market share is unlikely to be conducive to
new entrants without tight control of wholesale and balancing
markets. Therefore, in order to deliver more effective competition,
many member states have instigated some release of generation
capacity from the dominant suppliers, e.g. the UK and Italy. Other
member states, e.g. France and Ireland, have made capacity from the
incumbent generator available to the wholesale market through an
auction procedure.
Without significant competition being generated internally,
competition in the retail supply business has to come from cross
border transactions but these transactions may also be limited if the
arrangements for cross border transactions are discriminatory or if
congestion exists. Market share in supply therefore tends to reflect the
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generation market to some extent although the historical development
of regional distribution/supply companies has some impact. Many
member states have seen considerable consolidation of the retail
supply market.
In several models of market power in the electricity sector, the
price-cost margin (known also as the Lerner index) is used. The
Lerner index (L) measures how much the market price exceeds the
marginal costs of the last dispatched unit: L  = (P – MC)/P, where P is
the price and MC is the marginal cost. Unfortunately, there is a
significant practical obstacle to broader application of the Lerner
index – determining the utility’s marginal cost of production at any
given point in time. Without a measurement or reasonable estimate of
marginal cost, the ratio is incalculable.
The most common measure of market power is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI). HHI is the sum of the squares of all firms’
market shares. The HHI is a statistical index that is often used to
measure the degree of ownership concentration among suppliers in a
relevant market. It takes into account the relative size and distribution
of the firms in a market: in a pure monopoly where one firm has 100%
share, the HHI is 10,000; and when a market consists of a large
number of firms of relatively equal size, the HHI approaches zero.
The HHI increases both as the number of firms in the market
decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases.
Traditionally, the markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and
1800 are considered to be moderately concentrated, and those in
which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be
concentrated.
The HHI values for electricity supply sectors in EU Member
states ranged in September 2000 from 1209 in UK (England and
Wales) to 9800 in Greece (International,  2000). The HHI for the
Nordic electricity markets (based on energy shares) are low, ranging
from 836 in Finland to 1745 in Sweden, still reaching 3123 in East
Denmark. (NORDEL, 2002a). Our calculations for Estonia give the
HHI value of approximately 9600 (on the basis of production).
2.3. Situation in Estonian Electricity Sector: Problems of Small
Market
At present, most of the transition economies in Central and Eastern
Europe are also reforming and restructuring their electricity sector. A
central element of these reforms has been the introduction of
competition.
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The design of a reformed electricity market should make use of
international experience but transposing the same structures and rules
without taking into account the specific circumstances of country may
give rather negative results. Recently, economists have actively
participated in design efforts of many complex market institutions
notably within the public utilities deregulation context (Wilson, 2001;
Roth, 2002). When considering the electricity markets’ performance,
the market power issues are in the centre of the analysis. Because of
the technical and economic properties of an electricity system and
characteristics of electricity as a commodity, special tools are needed
to identify, diagnose and measure the market power 3.
The restructuring experience in many countries has indicated that
the process of ensuring effective and efficient competition in network
utilities in the presence of essential facilities is not straightforward.
The logical solution to ensure open, transparent and non-
discriminatory access to the essential facility or network is to
unbundle the industry and insist on ownership separation ?  that is, the
party that owns or controls the essential facility should have no
ownership stake in or ability to control the potentially competitive
services. The key issue is to identify the proper balance between
liberalisation and ensuring adequate generation and network capacity.
Whether and under what circumstances the ownership unbundling is
cost-effective is an empirical question, the answer to which may
change as a result of technical progress (Newbery,  2001).
The practice in several small countries indicates that the
introduction of effective competition in small markets may be
difficult.  It is often argued that economies of scale, low levels of
demand, fixed costs of restructuring, etc. are against the introduction
of competition into small markets.
The evidence from Europe and the United States suggest that
there are a number of conditions for successfully liberalising
electricity markets (Newbery,  2001). The first condition is that for the
wholesale market to be competitive, potential suppliers must have
access to the transmission system enabling them to reach customers.
This is best achieved by the ownership separation of transmission
from generation. The second condition is that there is adequate and
secure supply. For electricity, there are three conditions that need to
be satisfied for supply security: the network infrastructure must be
adequate and reliable; there is adequate generation capacity; and there
is security of supply of the primary fuels. The third condition is that
there is appropriate regulation of the markets of these liberalised
utilities. This condition is less obvious, and has been largely ignored
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by the Commission and many EU countries, but without it, there are
serious risks that the benefits of liberalisation may be lost.
The Estonian electricity sector has traditionally been organised
around a vertically integrated utility – Eesti Energia AS – a state-
owned enterprise that controls generation, transmission, distribution as
well as retail sales almost throughout the country. To date, only 2% of
installed generation capacity is owned by independent power
producers (IPP).
The electricity industry has been run by the state as an
administrative entity rather than a fully commercial business. Electri-
city tariffs covered mainly operational costs, therefore the need for
investments in generation and in particular in network systems had to
be ignored. In the beginning of the 1990’s, the process of restructuring
was initiated but it has been difficult to select a proper development
strategy for such a small system. The unbundling was started with the
splitting off the non-core activities and the separation of generation,
transmission and distribution at accounting level. In the next phase,
separate business entities were established for these main activity
fields, keeping all of them still within the state-owned power utility
Eesti Energia AS. Regarding privatisation, the sale of 49% of shares
of two largest power plants to a foreign investor was cancelled in
20024. Two relatively small distribution utilities were privatised, and
then the process was stopped as well, as a result of political debates on
ownership issues in energy sector. At the end of 1998, the Estonian
Government approved the new reconstruction and privatisation plan of
Eesti Energia AS and AS Eesti Põlevkivi , which is fundamentally
different from the privatisation logic of large energy firms as
stipulated in the current Fuel and Energy Sector Development Plan
(Long-Term,  1998). A policy was enacted that created a joint energy
firm which would comprise power plants and networks as well as the
fuel base in the form of oil shale mines. This plan follows closely the
vertical integration model in the electricity sector, the methods and
implementations of which have been described by Kwoka   (2002).
At present, the electricity sector is still almost completely state-
owned.  This, along with its small size, has made the introduction of
competition very difficult. The autonomous and transparent regulatory
framework is an important prerequisite for a well functioning
electricity system where competition is to be encouraged. In Estonia,
the regulation of the sector is carried out by a regulating body working
in the domain of ministry governing the whole energy sector, while
the state has retained ownership in utilities being regulated. This does
not assist in a clear separation of ‘policy’ from ‘regulation’ and, as a
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rule, complicates the introduction of new independent power
producers into Estonian market.
Industrial plants (autogeneration) as well as small-scale electri-
city providers should become important entities in small-scale
electricity markets. This would comply with the principles of the
distributed energy concept - an essential element of the security of
supply policy. Also, it should enable to deploy electricity generation
based on renewable sources. In principle, Estonia as a small country
can benefit from interconnection with neighbouring countries to
increase the size of market and thereby facilitate the introduction of
competition in the market.
For Estonia, the closest EU electricity market is the Nordic one.
According to market openness indicators, 5 all of the Nordic countries
are well connected in terms of transmission capacity to the other
Nordic countries. The openness of the Nordic electricity markets is
high, especially for Denmark, Sweden and Norway where the import
capacity is well above 20 percent of the internal generating capacity,
but more limited for Finland with about 10 percent. Still, at present,
the trade openness of these markets to outside the Nordic area is quite
low, reaching only for Denmark up to 16 percent (NORDEL,  2002b).
The idea of constructing a transmission system interconnection
between the Baltic and Nordic electricity systems has been under
discussion for several years already (Ministry, 2002). At present,
Estonian, Finnish and Latvian power companies are planning to lay a
power cable between Estonia and Finland to link the electrical power
systems of the Baltic countries and Scandinavia. The installation of
the proposed 315 MW underwater power cable between Estonia and
Finland, which is expected to cost about 100 million euros, should be
completed by 2005. Proposals to construct a transmission inter-
connection between Lithuania and Poland have also been discussed.
During accession negotiations with the EU, Estonia has applied
for several transition periods related to energy sector development.
The continuation of energy production from oil shale for at least 10
years is considered as one of the pillars of the electricity market in
Estonia. According to the present legislation, the Estonian electricity
market is open to eligible consumers with capacity at least 8 MW and
annual consumption at least 40 GWh, which means an open market
share of ca 10 percent. At present, full liberalisation of the electricity
market in Estonia is considered undesirable as it may mean end of oil
shale based energy production, which would not survive the
competitive pressure. This would be unacceptable to  Estonia, as the
restructuring of the oil shale energy sector rests on basically three
principles – security of supply of energy, balancing of foreign trade of
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Estonia and providing of employment in Ida-Viru County. Therefore,
Estonia has constructed a plan, which requires a transitional period
until the end of 2012.
Another important element of Estonia's request is granting EU
financing to oil shale research. The government places significant
priority on the support to the development of Estonian scientific
potential in the field of oil shale research. For Estonia, research in the
entire oil shale production chain is important, from the production of
oil shale energy to shale oil and chemical products. Therefore, Estonia
considers it necessary for the research projects to encompass the entire
oil shale production chain. The EU has noted the unique character of
Estonia’s oil shale and took into consideration its social and economic
aspects.
In reference to the opening of the electricity market, it was
provided in the Treaty of Accession (Treaty,  2003) that Estonia would
gradually open the electricity market according to the following
transition protocol:
? Estonia will open up 35% of its electricity market by 31
December 2008;
? Estonia will open its electricity market by 31 December
2012 in line with the Decisions of the Barcelona European
Council. (According to the decision of the Barcelona
European Council, the member states must provide energy
safeguards to all non-household electricity consumers by
the year 2004, which would see the liberalisation of the
market to at least a 60% level).
With this agreement, the EU has taken into account the social,
economic, regional, environmental and security aspects of Estonia’s
request, as well as the exceptional issues related to the restructuring of
the oil shale sector.
As to oil shale research, the EU agreed to Estonia’s request that
oil shale research be eligible for special purpose funding from the
ECSC Research Fund for Coal and Steel (which as of 24 July 2002
came under the European Commission’s administration). The term
“oil shale” was added to the list of research that fits in with the above-
mentioned fund’s objectives.
In Estonia, the problem is to find ways to introduce competition
without compromising other nationally important goals, particularly
those related to the problems of the oil shale-based energy complex.
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3. Reduction of the Dominating Role of Oil Shale-Based
Energy Production
3.1. The Structure of Energy Resources in Electricity Production
Although the share of oil shale has considerably diminished in energy
consumption in the recent decade, compared with the period before
1990, it is still high. Oil shale accounts for nearly 60% of all primary
energy consumption, and even 90% of electricity production. At the
same time, the renewable energy sources contribute 11% of the energy
balance, and only 0.2% of electricity production (data of 2000). Hydro
and wind energy comprised less than 0.1% (Table 3). In 2002, the
latter reached 0.3%.
Table 3.  Consumption of Energy Resources for Electricity
Production
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Electricity gross production, GWh 9218 8521 8268 8513 8483
Share of oil shale-based electricity, %
    incl. from oil shale
            from shale oil
95.7
95.3
0.4
93.9
93.5
0.4
93.1
92.3
0.8
91.1
90.7
0.4
90.5
90.0
0.5
Natural gas consumption, mill. m 3
Increase, %
Share of natural gas in electricity
production, %
21
1.3
26
+24
2.0
34
+31
2.6
89
+162
6.6
91
+2.2
6.7
Consumption of other fuels, TJ
Increase, %
Share of other fuels in electricity
production, %
2431
3.4
3041
+25
4.5
3079
+1.2
5.1
2324
-25
2.7
2698
+16
3.2
Electricity production from hydro- and
wind energy, GWh
    incl. hydroenergy, GWh
            wind energy, GWh
Share of hydro- and wind energy, %
3
2.95
0.05
5
4.70
0.30
5
4.68
0.32
6
5.67
0.33
8
7.72
0.28
0.1
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia. 1998… 2002.  Energy Balance
1997… 2001. Tallinn.
Oil shale-based energy production creates a remarkable negative
impact on the environment. Oil shale mining, production and
chemistry contaminate soil, create large amounts of waste, pollute air
and water. The impact of the oil-shale energy complex reveals itself
especially strongly in air pollution with solid waste, sulphur and
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nitrogen compounds and greenhouse gases (mainly CO 2). Emission of
the latter from oil shale is even greater than from the combustion of
other fossil fuels. Therefore, CO 2 emission per capita is relatively high
in Estonia (see Section 4.2).
In addition to involving high environmental risks, oil shale-based
electricity production has low energy efficiency. Own use of oil shale-
fired power plants has in recent years amounted to 10.5-11%, own use
together with losses in the system, however, account for up to one-
third of the electricity gross production. This is a reason why energy
consumption per unit of GDP (i.e. energy intensity) is in Estonia
several times higher than in the developed European countries (see
Section 4.2).
Considering all those factors and the generally acknowledged
principles of sustainable development, the accent in planning further
development of the Estonian energy sector is on the diversification of
electricity production to mitigate its environmental impact by finding
a reasonable alternative to oil shale-based energy production and by
territorial decentralisation of electricity production.
The reduction of the share of oil shale and the necessity to
develop energy production based on renewable and other (incl.
imported) resources is also envisaged in the current Fuel and Energy
Sector Development Plan (Long-Term,  1998). However, these
principles have not been essentially realised so far. The new
development plan up to the year 2015 (with a vision until 2030),
which is currently under elaboration, also envisages reduction of oil
shale-based energy production and proposes possible (allowed)
outputs of oil shale-based electricity in the future (Ministry,  2002).
The main technological measure to serve the environmental
targets in the 1998 Development Plan was the introduction of the
circulating fluidised bed combustion (CFBC) technology in oil shale-
based power plants.  This would lead to a considerable reduction of
SO2 emission and other hazardous wastes and would also considerably
slim down the generation of greenhouse gases (CO 2), improve the
efficiency factor of boilers, etc (Ots, 1999). Unfortunately, the
negative impact of energy production on the environment cannot be
sufficiently reduced without changing the structure of the energy
resources used, thus without introducing renewable energy resources
and fuels that create less pollution and do not cause the greenhouse
gas effect. To achieve this objective, the Development Plan suggested
levying relevant taxes and establishing limits for concentration of
pollutants in the flue gas dependant on the fuel.
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3.2. Reduction of Oil Shale-Based Electricity Production
In recent years, a number of studies and analyses have been conducted
in Estonia to evaluate the alternatives to electricity production and
find out its future prospects (Liik  and  Esop,  1999;  Laur  and Tenno,
1999; Vares,  2001; et al.). The results of these studies are similar and
confirm that oil shale-based energy production, primarily the duration
and scales of continuing oil shale-based electricity production, is and
will be the main issue for the Estonian energy sector during the next
10-15 years. The results of the studies indicate that the prime
competitor to oil shale in electricity production will be natural gas –
by 2010 gas-based electricity production may be cheaper even without
combined heat production. A considerable competitor to oil shale in
the combined production of electricity and heat may be also coal. An
attractive possibility, primarily from the point of view of reducing
environmental impacts, is a scenario concerning electricity import.
A key issue of oil shale-based energy sector development is the
consideration of environmental impacts. It should be emphasised that
the estimates of the competitiveness of oil shale-based electricity so
far have been based on the assumption that the present, relatively
conservative environmental and energy policy will continue. This
actually indicates insufficient consideration of the environmental
impacts. An example of the implementation of a more radical
environmental policy in this paper is the prognosticated maximum
version of the oil shale-based electricity production price in the year
2010 (see Table 4).
We have prognosticated the oil shale-based electricity production
cost in 2005 and 2010 taking into account the requirements of the
Estonian Environment Strategy and the Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the limitation of emissions of certain
air pollutants from large combustion plants (2001/80/EC). The latter
set limitations to the net production of Narva Power Plants – up to
6600 GWh after 2005 and 5340 GWh after 2008 (Ministry,  2002).
Prognostications of pollution charges for 2005 are based on the
rates established in the Pollution Charge Act Amendment Act
(Pollution,  2001). For 2010, there are two versions of prognosis. In the
first version (low), the pollution charge and resource tax growth rates
have been proposed based on the Estonian environment policy so far.
For example, the CO 2 tax rate will be 30 kroons/t (according to the
Pollution Charge Act Amendment Act it will be 11.3 kroons/t in
2005). We have also considered the rise in efficiency and the potential
Table 4.  The Oil Shale-Based Electricity Production Cost and Forecasts
2001, actual Forecasts
20102005 Low environmental costs High environmental costsCost items sent/
kWh % sent/kWh %
sent/
kWh %
sent/
kWh %
Materials, consumables and supplies
    incl. resource payments
25.8
1.3
68.1
3.5
29.2
1.5
63.1
3.2
33.5
2.4
54.1
3.9
33.5
2.4
43.7
Operating expenses
    incl. environmental costs
6.8
4.2
18.0
11.2
8.9
6.0
19.2
13.0
14.9
11.0
24.0
17.7
29.6
25.7
38.6
33.6
Personnel expenses 11.8 31.2 14.8 32.0 20.8 33.6 20.8 27.1
Other expenses 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2
Depreciation 6.6 17.4 7.6 16.4 10.5 17.0 10.5 13.7
Total costs 51.2 135.0 60.7 131.1 79.9 129.1 94.6 123.5
Sales of by-products -13.2 -35.0 -14.4 -31.1 -18.0 -29.1 -18.0 -23.4
Total oil shale-based electricity
production costs 38.0 100.0 46.3 100.0 61.9 100.0 76.6 100.0
Net production, GWh 6596 6430 5300 5300
Production cost,   sent/kWh
                               EUR/100 kWh
    incl. environmental costs,
                               sent/kWh
                         EUR/100 kWh
38
2.4
6
0.4
100.0
15.8
46
3
8
0.5
100.0
17.4
62
4
13
0.8
100.0
21.0
77
4.9
28
1.8
100.0
36.4
Sources:   Eesti Energia AS. 2002. Annual Report 2001/2002, Tallinn; Eesti Energia AS. 2002.  Environmental Report 2001. Tallinn
Pollution Charge Act Amendment Act. 2001. Riigi Teataja (State Gazette). I 2001, 102, 667.
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reduction of pollution emissions as a result of technological
reconstruction of the Narva Power Plants.
In the second version (high), for the year 2010, we have
experimentally based our prognosis on the CO 2 tax rates proposed by
the European Union in the mid-1990s  - 10 USD per oil barrel
equivalent (European,  1995), which with the present exchange rate of
the US dollar equals approximately 300 kroons per tonne of CO 2.
However, our prognosis still takes into account only half of this rate –
150 kroons/t. This is a very high rate for Estonia, though many EU
countries (for instance, Nordic countries Denmark and Sweden)
already today have much higher CO 2 tax rates (Database, 2001).
Our results (presented in Table 4) indicate that the oil shale-
based electricity production cost in Narva Power Plants was 38
Estonian sents/kWh or 2.4 EUR/100 kWh according to the 2001/2002
financial year report (Annual, 2002). Of this, 15.8% were
environmental costs 6. The environmental costs and their share will
increase in the future. The oil shale-based electricity production cost
in the year 2005 will be 46 sents/kWh or 3 EUR/100 kWh, where the
environmental costs will account for 17.4%. In 2010, in the lower
version of environmental costs, the oil shale-based electricity
production cost may rise to 62 sents/kWh or 4 EUR/100 kWh, and in
the higher version of environmental costs to 77 sents/kWh (4.9
EUR/100 kWh). The share of environmental costs in 2010 will grow
as high as 21% and 36.4%, respectively.
While the depletion of the economic advantages of oil shale-
based electricity production is not a very precisely defined process,
depending on various factors (electricity demand, prices of energy
resources, etc.), the environmental restrictions laid down within the
European Union, those established with other international agreements
or those resulting from Estonia’s own normative documents, set quite
concrete limits to oil shale-based electricity production. So, the SO 2
marginal rates fixed in the Estonian Environment Strategy allow to
produce after 2005 on the basis of oil shale ca 6.6 TWh of electricity 7
per year – on the assumption that the ongoing renovation of two
energy units in the Narva power plants will yield the expected results.
But, if they continue with the old technology, it would be possible to
produce not more than 4 TWh of electricity per year after 2005
(Ministry, 2002).
New model calculations using the planning system MARKAL
(Goldstein,  1994) have been conducted for the possible development
scenarios in the Development Plan for Estonian electricity sector
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(Department,  2002) that has been formulated within the preparation of
a new long-term development plan for the fuel and energy sector
(Ministry 2002). The results of these calculations also indicate that the
first priority, aside from oil shale, is natural gas-fired combined
production plants (within the existing heat load), followed by natural
gas-fired condensation plants. Wind and other renewable energy
capacities will be used as possible given potential resources. After
new oil-shale energy blocks are put into operation after 2010, the use
of natural gas will diminish, but the capacity of natural gas-fired
plants is needed to compensate for wind generator fluctuations.
Unfortunately, investments in scenarios involving new oil-shale
blocks are much larger than in other scenarios.
However, the results of the model calculations we described
previously do not give a definitive answer for the future of oil shale-
based energy production in a longer perspective.  This is because  we
do not  know the results of the first renovation stage in Narva Power
Plants currently in progress. These results will tell what could be the
role of oil shale-based energy production in providing sufficient
electricity supply for Estonia. The following developments are
possible in the period 2005–2015:
1. Annual net production of oil shale-based electricity will be
possible at the level of 6.6 TWh after 2005.
2. Annual net production of oil shale-based electricity will fall
below 6.6 TWh during the period 2005–2015.
Possible reasons: renovation will not yield expected
results, restrictions on emissions or environment taxes
will become even stricter, oil-shale and/or oil shale-
based electricity production capacities will exhaust
themselves earlier than expected.
3. Net production of oil shale-based electricity in excess of 6.6
TWh after 2005.
Such development can be realised if the renovation of
the first blocks in Narva Power Plants yields better
results than expected, oil shale-based electricity
production technology will develop further and
renovation will continue. At the same time, the above-
mentioned environmental restrictions could be
moderated or their implementation postponed.
Based on the analyses so far, the first and second development
scenarios or their combination are more likely.
22
3.3. Possible Scenarios for Covering Electricity Demand
Based on the environmental restrictions and electricity demand
forecasts, we have drafted possible scenarios for covering electricity
demand.  The variation of the scenarios is caused by covering of the
unsatisfied part of electricity demand by using various combinations
of imported energy resources.
The calculation results indicate that (depending on the prognosis
of electricity demand) it will be necessary to produce additionally on
the basis of imported resources or to import approximately 1500-2400
GWh of electricity in 2010 and 1700-3200 GWh in 2015. There will
probably be no such need in 2005 yet. However, it will not be possible
any more to export electricity then. We discuss three possible
scenarios to cover such electricity demand. In the first (I) scenario
all the electricity supply deficit will be covered with additional
production of natural gas-based electricity. The second (II) scenario
envisages covering of the deficit by 60% with gas-based electricity
and by 40% with imported electricity. In the third (III) scenario gas-
based electricity contributes 50%, imported electricity 25% and the
remaining 25% will be covered by electricity produced from coal. The
need for additional imported energy resources to cover electricity
demand in the period studied according to the above-described
scenarios is depicted in Table 5.
The first (I) scenario (natural gas) must be regarded as having the
best future outlook from both the environmental impact, foreign trade
and other aspects (Department,  2002). According to this, the potential
for the combined production of electricity and heat is the first thing to
be supplied from new, natural gas-based electricity production
capacities. In the next stage (around 2015), there may arise a need also
for new condensation power plants (especially if the development of
electricity consumption will be in the direction of maximum
prognosis). In the second scenario where 60% of the electricity deficit
will be covered with additional production of gas-based electricity and
40% with imported electricity, the need for new electricity production
capacities is smaller. In the third scenario (gas-based electricity 50%,
imported electricity 25%, coal-based electricity 25%), it would be
necessary to import more coal for electricity production. However, the
expediency of the latter is still disputable, because compared with oil
shale-based electricity production, there will be no considerable
alleviation in environment pollution and the risks involved in
unpredictability of environmental taxes will remain. A positive point
in using coal is the expanding choice of resources, which is important
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from the security of supply aspect.
Table 5. Need for Additional Imported Energy Resources to Cover
Electricity Demand
2010 2015
Electricity
consumption
Electricity
consumption
min max min max
Need for electricity supply to network to be
covered by imports, GWh 1500 2400 1700 3200
I  Scenario:  Natural gas 100%
Needed amount of natural gas, mill. m 3 430 690 430 820
II  Scenario:    Natural gas 60%
Imported electricity 40%
Needed amount of natural gas, mill. m 3
Needed amount of imported electricity, GWh
260
600
410
960
260
680
490
1280
III  Scenario:   Natural gas 50%
Imported electricity 25%
Coal 25%
Needed amount of natural gas, mill. m 3
Needed amount of imported electricity, GWh
Needed amount of coal, thous. t
220
375
170
350
600
270
220
430
170
410
800
320
The analysis results allow us to state that investment decisions
involving the development of the Estonian energy sector must be
made very soon – whether to continue renovation of oil shale-based
power plants or stake (in which scales) on imported fuels-based
electricity production as well as import electricity. In order to reduce
risks involved in these decisions, it is necessary to carry out additional
investigations, for example, to evaluate the negative aspects involved
in increasing the import of energy resources. Estonia must also specify
the possibilities of electricity production based on renewable energy
resources and conduct a detailed analysis of the investment needs
regarding all competitive possibilities to cover electricity demand.
These decisions largely depend also on the first stage renovation
results of Narva Power Plants.
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4.  Sustainability Indices of the Estonian Energy Sector
Energy consumption intensity indicators in relation to gross domestic
product (GDP) are discussed as a part of the main sustainable
development indicators of the energy sector (United,  2001). In our
previous research, we have analysed energy consumption intensity in
Estonia and various other energy consumption indicators, and
compared them with respective indicators of the European Union
member states and candidate countries until the year 1999 (Laur,  
Soosaar  and  Tenno, 2001; 2002). In this paper, we analyse the long-
term dynamics of final energy consumption intensity in Estonia as it is
prepared by the Statistical Office (Statistical,  2002), and primary
energy, electricity and carbon dioxide (CO 2) emission intensity
indicators for 2000, which have been calculated using the
International Energy Agency database (International,  2002). The
indicators have been harmonised through the use of national
purchasing power parities (PPP).
4.1. Dynamics of Energy Consumption Intensity in Estonia
Here we discuss the dynamics of final energy consumption intensity
indicators in Estonia in the period 1994-2000. The Statistical Office of
Estonia has calculated the energy consumption intensities in this
period in the national economy (ratio of final energy consumption to
GDP), in transport (ratio of energy consumption by transport to value
added), in manufacturing (ratio of energy consumption by
manufacturing to value added) and in households (energy
consumption by households per capita) (Statistical, 2002). They have
also produced ratios of these indicators to 1994 (1994=100%). The
latter are presented in Table 6 and in Figure 1.
Table 6. Energy Consumption Intensity, 1994-2000 (1994=100)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total 100 90 92 82 74 65 58
Transport 100 101 56 34 33 26 24
Manufacturing 100 65 59 46 38 33 26
Households 100 111 109 145 128 120 122
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia. 2002. Indicators of Sustainable
Development. Tallinn.
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As you can see from the Figure 1, the final energy consumption
intensity has been decreasing in the national economy, in transport
and in manufacturing throughout the period, but has considerably
increased in households where it peaked in 1997. This can be
explained by the decline in energy consumption throughout the last
decade as a result of the contraction of production and the structural
changes in the economy. The increasing energy consumption intensity
in households, however, tells about a rise in the income of households.
In conclusion, it means a rise in the energy consumption efficiency,
which is certainly a positive tendency in the development of the
Estonian energy sector.
Figure 1. Energy Consumption Intensity (1994=100)
4.2. Comparison of Sustainability Indices of the Estonian Energy
Sector with Other Countries
Table 7 contains sustainability data for comparison of the Estonian
energy sector with EU member states and candidate countries in 2000.
For comparison with Estonia, we have taken the average of all 15 EU
member states (EU-15) and Nordic countries – Finland, Sweden,
Denmark and Norway (non-EU member country), as well as great
powers – France, Germany and United Kingdom. Regarding the
candidate countries, we take the average of the ten first countries (CC-
10) invited to join the EU (2004) and separately Lithuania, Latvia,
Poland and Czech Republic (countries with more similar climate
conditions).
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 Table 7. Comparative Data of the Main Energy-Related Indicators, 2000
Per capita Per GDP(PPP), USD'95
GDP(PPP),
USD'95
TPES,
t oe
Electricity
consumption, kWh
CO2 emission *,
t
TPES,
kg oe
Electricity
consumption, kWh
CO2 emission
kg
EU-15 average 21875 3.86 6547 8.35 0.18 0.30 0.38
France 22596 4.26 7302 6.18 0.19 0.32 0.27
Germany 23246 4.13 6684 10.14 0.18 0.29 0.44
United Kingdom 21141 3.89 5995 8.89 0.18 0.28 0.42
Finland 23807 6.40 15274 10.58 0.27 0.64 0.44
Sweden 22976 5.35 15661 5.86 0.23 0.68 0.26
Denmark 25687 3.64 6481 9.38 0.14 0.25 0.37
Norway 26301 5.71 25187 7.48 0.22 0.96 0.28
CC-10 average 10088 2.64 3725 7.47 0.26 0.37 0.74
Estonia 8745 3.30 4628 10.21 0.38 0.53 1.17
Lithuania 6554 1.92 2381 3.03 0.29 0.32 0.46
Latvia 6608 1.54 2080 2.76 0.23 0.31 0.42
Poland 9013 2.33 3223 7.58 0.26 0.36 0.84
Czech Republic 13042 3.93 5695 11.57 0.30 0.44 0.89
* From fuel combustion
   Source: http://www.iea.org/statist/keyworld2002/key2002/keystats.htm
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The first discussed indicator, GDP per capita, is presented in
1995 US dollars (USD’95) considering the national purchasing power
parities. Naturally, both the EU average GDP per capita and that of all
EU member states are much higher than those of the candidate
countries. Estonia’s GDP per capita is 2.5 times smaller than the EU-
15 average, 2.9 times smaller than in Denmark and 3 times smaller
than in Norway. Estonia’s GDP per capita is also 1.2 times smaller
than the CC-10 average and 1.5 times smaller than the Czech
Republic’s GDP. CC-10 average GDP per capita is 2.2 times smaller
than the EU-15 average.
Finland, of all the countries discussed, has the highest total
primary energy supply (TPES) in tonnes of oil equivalent (oe) per
capita, followed by Norway, Sweden, France and Germany. The
Finnish level exceeds the Estonian level by nearly three times, and the
CC-10 average even more. EU-15 average exceeds the CC-10 average
by 1.5 times.
The situation is analogous in electricity consumption per
capita. Electricity consumption is the highest in Norway (over 25
thousand kWh), exceeding even the other Nordic countries Sweden
and Finland over 1.6 times, EU-15 average nearly 4 times. Electricity
consumption in Estonia lags behind the Finnish level by 3.3 times and
EU-15 average 1.4 times. Such big differences in electricity
consumption per capita can be partly explained by the cold climate in
the case of Nordic countries, but large electricity consumption is
above all characterising better economic development and higher
standard of living as well.
CO2 emission from fuel combustion per capita (in tonnes) is
the biggest in Czech Republic, followed by Finland, Estonia and
Germany with almost equal amounts. EU-15 average is 20% smaller
than in Estonia. CO 2 emission is, as you know, primarily connected
with the combustion of fossil fuels.  Particularly large CO 2 emissions
result from the combustion of solid fuels – coal and oil shale. The
small population of Estonia against the background of relatively large
energy consumption causes the very high value of this indicator. The
reduction of this value is possible only by diminishing the share of oil-
shale in Estonian energy sector.
The ratio of primary energy consumption intensity to GDP is
the highest just in Estonia (0.38 kg oe/USD’95). The Estonian
indicator exceeds the respective indicators of both Nordic countries
and other Baltic States. The closest to Estonia by this indicator is the
Czech Republic (0.3 kg oe/USD’95), and Finland (0.27 kg
oe/USD’95) from among EU members.
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A high value of primary energy consumption intensity indicates
low level of energy consumption efficiency. Of course, the great
difference of this indicator across countries is largely due to the
different energy needs between northern and southern countries.
However, the difference between Estonia and Finland lies primarily in
our small GDP, as energy consumption in Finland is nearly two times
bigger than in Estonia, but GDP 2.7 times bigger (per capita).
High electricity consumption intensity cannot be evaluated
simply as an indicator of low efficiency. Though higher intensity
indicates here higher GDP electricity intensity, it should be considered
that higher electricity consumption characterises, as mentioned above,
also rise of income. Norway is the first by this indicator among the
countries examined by us (0.96 kWh/USD’95), followed by Sweden
and Finland. Estonia’s indicator also is relatively high (0.53
kWh/USD’95). Unfortunately this is not due to high electricity
consumption, but rather a low GDP level.
CO2 emission intensity indicates negative impact of energy
consumption on the environment. Estonia is firmly on the first place
with this indicator among the countries studied by us. Estonia’s
indicator (1.17 kg/USD’95) exceeds the EU-15 average three times,
other Baltic countries and Finland 2.5-2.8 times. The reasons are, of
course, both the large CO 2 emission of oil-shale energy and the low
GDP level in Estonia.
Our analysis indicates that in order to ensure the sustainable
development of the Estonian energy sector, we need to raise the
energy consumption efficiency and reduce pollution (especially CO 2
emissions). Both indicators are negatively influenced by oil shale
utilisation that dominates electricity production in Estonia, which has
low efficiency and high CO 2 emission. Thus, the key of sustainable
development of the Estonian energy sector lies in the mitigation of the
environmental impact by increasing efficiency of the oil shale-based
electricity production and/or reducing the share of oil shale in the
Estonian energy balance.
5. Concluding Remarks
The opening of electricity markets in Europe started in the late 1980s.
This process has been very rapid in several countries of the European
Union – Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany and Austria
have opened their electricity market 100% by today. However, there
are some factors limiting rapid opening of the markets and in some
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countries this process is proceeding slowly (France). Opposition to
liberalisation is caused primarily by the high risks involved in
investment in new capacities, especially in more expensive,
environment saving technologies. This in turn may create a deficit in
energy supply when there is an unexpected increase in consumption,
for example. To lessen the risks and increase the security of supply
concentration of electricity, enterprises have started to spread by way
of mergers and buying of other enterprises, and this process may
extend also across national borders. In the Nordic countries, the three
largest firms (Vattenfall in Sweden, Statkraft in Norway and Fortum
in Finland) contributed 40% of the total production of the Nordic
countries as a result of concentration.
The Estonian electricity market has, on the one hand, features of
a typical monopolistic market where one vertically integrated energy
enterprise (Eesti Energia AS) dominates. Its prices are under state
regulation, but it is dictating conditions and connection fees to small
producers for access to its network. On the other hand, an original
feature of Estonia is also a monopoly in the supply of energy
resources, as 90% of electricity is produced from oil shale. The latter
fact is also a reason for the low efficiency of Estonian energy system
and the high pollution load on the environment.
Due to the dominating role of Eesti Energia AS, the value of the
most common measure of market power – the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) for Estonia is remarkably high – approximately 9600 (on
the basis of production). Traditionally, the markets in which the HHI
is between 1000 and 1800 are considered to be moderately
concentrated, and those in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points
are considered to be concentrated (in a pure monopoly where one firm
has 100% share, the HHI is 10,000).
But, as oil shale-based energy complex has a specific
significance in Estonian economy, Estonia was granted a transition
period in the accession negotiations with the EU both for opening its
electricity market and for reducing air pollution from oil shale-based
energy enterprises.
Considering these factors and following the widely accepted
principles of sustainable development, the main emphasis in planning
further development of the Estonian energy sector is placed on
mitigating the environmental impacts of electricity production. The
possibilities of achieving this are envisaged to be both the
implementation of new, less environment-damaging technologies
(CFBC) in oil shale-based energy production and the reduction of the
share of oil shale and the introduction of reasonable alternatives to oil
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shale in electricity production. However, oil shale has been
economically competitive with other energy resources so far.
Therefore, we have thoroughly analysed in this paper the growing role
of environmental costs in oil shale-based electricity production and
their impact on the oil shale-based electricity production cost under
tightening environmental requirements in the short term (taking into
account the Directive on the limitation of emissions of certain air
pollutants from large combustion plants 2001/80/EC and the pollution
charge and resource tax growth rates). This analysis indicates that
while currently the environmental component accounts for nearly 16%
of the oil shale-based electricity production cost, by 2010 the
production cost may rise twofold and the contribution of the
environmental component even to 36%. Consequently, it is likely that
economic advantages of oil shale-based electricity production over
other fuels will diminish.
Model calculations carried out both by other researchers and by
the authors of this chapter have demonstrated that when oil shale-
based electricity production diminishes, the first competitors will be
natural gas-based combined electricity and heat production plants.
However, in this case, the heat load of the region will set limits to
electricity production. The next competitor is a gas-based
condensation plant. Wind and other renewable energy capacities are
used within the available resources, but their share in the electricity
balance does not exceed 0.3% currently. It is not possible to make any
ultimate long-term decisions about oil shale-based electricity
production until the first stage results of the currently ongoing
renovation of Narva Elektrijaamad are not clear. When the renovation
results are positive and emission of pollutants will fall to the expected
level, then oil shale-based electricity production may continue in the
period 2005-2010 in the amount of 6.6 TWh/y, after 2010 in the
amount of 5.3 TWh/y. As a result of growing demand for electricity,
the unsatisfied demand for electricity may in that case amount to the
maximum of 2.4 TWh in 2010 and 3.2 TWh in 2015. It is possible to
use mainly imported energy resources (natural gas, coal, imported
electricity) to cover this demand. If renovation results are worse than
expected, the Estonian energy strategy needs to be fundamentally
revalued and other alternatives must be found to oil shale-based
energy production to ensure the sustainable development of the energy
sector.
By examining more important development indicators of the
Estonian energy sector so far and comparing them with respective
indicators of EU member states and our neighbouring countries, we
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can detect quite positive tendencies. The positivity is expressed
primarily in that the GDP energy intensity as the main indicator of the
sustainability of the energy sector has been diminishing in Estonia
throughout 1994-2000, while the energy consumption by households
has increased at the same time. This indicates a rise primarily in
energy use efficiency, but, in a way, also in personal income.
Although energy consumption per capita is lower in Estonia
compared with the EU average and the Nordic countries, GDP energy
intensity is much higher here. This is primarily due to the low GDP
level in Estonia. The most negative indicator for Estonia is the high
CO2 emission both per capita and in ratio to GDP, notwithstanding the
continuous reduction of the total amount of CO 2 in recent years.
In conclusion, we can state that in addition to restructuring the
electricity sector and organising opening of the electricity market,
Estonia needs to make investment decisions – whether to continue
renovation of oil shale-based power plants or stake on imported
energy resources. Participation in the renovation of Ignalina
(Lithuania) nuclear power plant has also arisen to the agenda lately,
where the so far working units should be closed in 2005-2009
according to plans. This would give Estonia an opportunity to
participate as a partner also in the Baltic and Nordic electricity
markets and to control (or influence) electricity prices in the market.
Notes
1. Estonian oil shale-based energy complex is mainly situated in Ida-Viru
County.
2. For example deficit of electricity s ystems peak capacity in the Nordic
countries in winter 2002, partly also the crisis in the Californian
electricity sector, etc.
3. New tools have been developed to enable to deal with complication of
these new markets by providing guidance on details of market design,
as well as helping to predict how procedural aspects influence
participants’ strategies and affect overall performance (Staropoli and
Jullien, 2002;  Wilson, 1998). These tools have contributed to the
emergence of a new discipline, the so-called “design economics” in
which economists play a role similar to engineers or architects
(Wilson, 2001).
4. Negotiations with the potential foreign investor NRGenerating
International B. V. (NRGen) failed as the parties could not agree on
mutual obligations.
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5. Export (import) openness is calculated as the permissible export
(import) capacity of electricity divided by the total generation capacity.
6. 1 EUR = 15.64664 EEK (exchange rate is fixed)
7. We mean here electricity net production or electricity sup plied to
network.
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